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Abstract
Hypothetical bias arises when values which people say they place on a good or service differ system-
atically from the values people reveal for the same good or service through actual, binding economic
transactions. Studies of hypothetical bias with respect to public goods often use charitable contributions
or other relatively unique goods and these studies employ a variety of mechanisms to elicit the stated and
revealed values. This study proposes the inclusion of a free-rider barring random dictatorship mecha-
nism in the standard public contribution game to investigate the issue of bias when a public good involves
immediate monetary returns to subjects. Steps are taken to make the game have the look and feel of a
real-world tradeoff between private investment and public good provision. Data for the experiment were
collected using a sample of students from the University of Alberta. A statistically signiﬁcant negative
hypothetical bias is found for the ﬁrst hypothetical and the ﬁrst real rounds of the game. The bias decays
in subsequent round pairs, oscillating around zero.
1 Introduction and Objectives
Economic valuation of private goods in market economies is generally based on market prices, from
which willingness to pay (WTP) for the respective commodity can be inferred. Public goods do not
have market prices. Markets fail to emerge for public goods because these goods are non-excludable and
non-rival in consumption. The basic principle behind public good valuation is thus to make their values
comparable with those of private goods. This requires attaching some sort of monetary value to public
goods.
The hypothetical nature of contingent valuation surveys, a technique that can be used to measure the
value of essentially any public good, can result in responses that differ systematically in magnitude from
actualpayments, ifthoseweretobecollected. Thisdifferencebetweenstatedandrevealedvaluesisoften
referred to as ‘hypothetical bias’ (Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze 1986).1 There is a common belief
among non-market valuation researchers that hypothetical bias exists and is usually positive, that is WTP
revealed from a real choice experiment is lower than that revealed from a hypothetical choice experiment
(e.g., Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom 1995, Loomis et al. 1997, List and Shogren 1998). In addition,
there is a growing literature that focuses on testing techniques designed to mitigate hypothetical bias.
¤Corresponding author. Support for this project was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of
Canada (SSHRC).
1The terms revealed, real and actual are used interchangeably and refer to situations in which an individual makes a consequen-
tial economic commitment. In experimental studies, this typically involves monetary payment for a good by the participant. Stated
or hypothetical values refer to survey responses that lack any salient economic commitment (Murphy et al. 2005).
1Examples of these techniques are ‘cheap talk’ scripts (Cummings and Taylor 1999) and ‘consequential’
survey (Bulte et al. 2005). There is no established theory explaining hypothetical bias despite numerous
studies investigating this phenomenon and hypotheses suggested.
Two basic questions about hypothetical bias have become paramount (Murphy et al. 2005). First,
what is its magnitude (both the existence and sign)? Second, what factors are responsible for this bias?
The ﬁrst objective of this study is to assess the magnitude of hypothetical bias in a laboratory experiment
with a modiﬁed standard public goods game as an elicitation mechanism. We also attempt to evaluate
the effect of several behavioral factors as well as certain socio-demographic factors on the degree of
hypothetical bias.
Experiments are being used to ‘testbed’ valuation techniques in non-market valuation literature
(Adamowicz and DeShazo 2006). Theoretically, hypothetical bias can be detected by conducting two
sets of experiments which should be identical in everything except one aspect. In one experiment, people
must actually buy a good after stating their WTP (real experiment), while the other experiment is purely
hypothetical and subjects do not make any market transactions (hypothetical experiment).
We believe that the standard public goods game is the appropriate foundation for such a set of exper-
iments. It offers a public good whose consumption is easy to monetize and which can be easily provided
both hypothetically and for real. The abstract nature of the contribution game is not conducive to ef-
fects of warm-glow or any kind of ‘do-gooder’ bias. Also, the standard public goods game provides a
unique mechanism for eliciting both hypothetical and real values of the good. But the standard pub-
lic goods game has its own shortcomings which make it per se inappropriate for non-market valuation
purposes. Accordingly, we modify the standard voluntary contribution game in two ways to ensure the
compatibility of our experiment with a non-market valuation study. What emerges is a ‘Pocket and Pot’
game.
First, a risky lottery is introduced in addition to the public pool (the ‘Pot’) and the uninvested portion.
The standard public goods game offers a public good whose consumption is easy to monetize and which
can be easily provided both hypothetically and for real. However, the monetary value of any good
only makes sense if a dollar spent on that good has the same value as the next best use. Second, the
random dictatorship mechanism is introduced to determine the ‘winning’ contribution to the public Pot.
The standard public goods game allows its players to practice strategic behavior which includes free-
riding. Random dictatorship as a collective choice mechanism is introduced to eliminate the possibility
of free-riding to the extent possible (Gibbard 1977 and Dutta, Peters, and Sen 2002). In other words, no
free-riding is allowed in the suggested game, no one can be excluded from this redistribution and each
player gets the same amount of tokens from the common pool.
In what follows, Section 2 provides a literature review on hypothetical bias. The rationale for the
experiment and a hypotheses to test are covered in Section 3. Section 4 lays out the design of the
modiﬁed public goods game and details its major components. Experiment results are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a summary of ﬁndings, addresses limitations of the game and
outlines recommendations for future research.
2 Literature Overview
Bohm (1972) was one of the ﬁrst to raise questions about hypothetical bias and its magnitude. Having
compared several different approaches to estimating the demand for a public good and checked for the
presence of hypothetical bias, Bohm (1972) establishes several requirements that must be met in order
to get meaningful results about how much people would like to contribute to the output of a public good.
First, the provision of a public good must be of a concern to the majority of the population. Secondly,
the public good chosen must be well described and be realistic (quality, speciﬁc characteristics, the cost
of production, etc.). Finally, for the experiment to mimic a real-world situation, it is necessary to have a
large number of respondents involved.
FollowingBohm’sseminalpaper, numerous non-marketvaluationstudieshad analyzed the hypothet-
ical bias issue. Bishop and Heberlain (1986) found that hypothetical values for hunting permits exceed
2actual values by 30–130%.2 In contrast, Dickie, Fisher, and Gerking (1987) did not ﬁnd a statistically
signiﬁcant hypothetical bias. Subsequent research, however, has suggested that stated values typically
exceed actual values. For example, Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom (1995) ﬁnd hypothetical bias to
be 163%; Loomis et al. (1997) ﬁnd that hypothetical values exceed actual values by 86–200%; List and
Shogren (1998) ﬁnd hypothetical bias to be 119–247%. Sometimes the magnitude of hypothetical bias is
very large; Neil et al. (1994) ﬁnd that hypothetical values exceed actual values by 201–2,401%. Several
studies fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero hypothetical bias (Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson
1998, Sinden 1988, Smith and Mansﬁeld 1998). There are also several private good valuation studies
that report negative hypothetical bias (McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993, Johannesson, Liljas, and
Johansson 1998, and Grifﬁn et al. 1995).
What are the reasons or factors explaining hypothetical bias? While numerous studies look at the
bias’ magnitude, the literature still lacks models which would put it in an economic framework. Champ
et al. (1997) and Champ and Bishop (2001) suggest that hypothetical bias is manifested by an identiﬁ-
able minority of subjects. Champ, Moore, and Bishop (2004) propose that the bias results from counting
uncertain ‘yeses’ as ﬁrm ones when valuing the good hypothetically. Brown and Taylor (2000) investi-
gate the role of gender as a possible explanation of hypothetical bias and ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference
in the percentage of females and males stating a positive value in both hypothetical and real treatments.
However, the mean WTP for females in the study is signiﬁcantly different from that for males in both
the hypothetical treatment and the real one.
Although a large number of studies with different experimental protocols provide evidence that re-
spondents tend to overstate their true WTP in hypothetical settings, other studies do not show any pres-
ence of hypothetical bias; see Sinden (1988), Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson (1998), Smith and
Mansﬁeld (1998), Cummings and Taylor (1999), Balistreri et al. (2001).
In response to the observation that stated preferences are prone to hypothetical bias, researchers have
proposed different ways to reduce the gap between stated and revealed preference estimates. For ex-
ample, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) guidelines, NOAA (1994) and
NOAA (1996), suggested calibrating hypothetical responses to actual choices, and several researchers
proposed providing additional explicit information so that respondents could self correct their stated
preferences during the survey or experiment. This additional information can be provided in the form
of ‘cheap talk’ (Cummings and Taylor 1999) or in the form of a ‘consequential’ survey or experiment
(Bulte et al. 2005).34
The reported efﬁcacy of the cheap-talk design has not always been high. For example, Aadland and
Caplan (2003) ﬁnd that, although cheap talk is ineffective overall, it successfully reduces hypothetical
bias for certain groups of respondents. Aadland, Caplan, and Phillips (2007) treat cheap talk as a mech-
anism that reduces uncertainty—respondents can ignore it completely or take it into account and use
to update the uncertain value they place on the good. To test the theoretical result, Aadland, Caplan,
and Phillips (2007) propose an experimental design that distinguishes the effects of anchoring and cheap
talk on the valuation of a generic public good by mimicking the way contingent valuation surveys are
typically implemented in practice.
There have been attempts to combine the numerous hypothetical bias studies together in order to
establish what study design factors affect hypothetical bias and in what direction; see List and Gallet
(2001), Murphy et al. (2005). List and Gallet (2001) conducted a meta analysis on data from numerous
experimental studies in order to determine how experimental protocol affects hypothetical bias measured
by the calibration factor.5 There are several major results of the study. First, the data suggested that the
calibration factor is not affected by whether an experiment takes place in the lab or ﬁeld. It provides ev-
2Hanemann (1984) points out some deﬁciencies in this study.
3‘Cheap talk’ entails reading a script that explicitly highlights the hypothetical bias problem before participants make any
decisions.
4It has been argued that respondents who perceive a survey or experiment to be ‘consequential’ will respond to questions
truthfully regardless of the degree of perceived consequentiality (Mitchell and Carson 1989).
5The calibration factor is the ratio of the average hypothetical WTP and the average real WTP.
3idence that nuances such as subject pools, social distance, and subtleties associated with the laboratory
setting may not compromise the generality of empirical ﬁndings. Second, the calibration factor obtained
from a WTP study is lower than a comparable calibration factor from a WTA study. Third, the calibration
factor obtained from the analysis of a private good is lower than a comparable calibration factor from the
analysis of a public good. Lastly, the calibration factors are not signiﬁcantly different between within-
and between-group treatments. Murphy et al. (2005) noticed a major ﬂaw in the meta-analysis described
above. Several of the preference valuation studies used in List and Gallet (2001) report different mech-
anisms for eliciting hypothetical and actual values. It means that hypothetical bias now is attributed not
only to monetary consequences of a real choice, but is also contaminated by different elicitation mecha-
nisms. Among other things, Murphy et al. (2005) report that both student pools and group experiments
seem to reduce hypothetical bias. Also, choice-based elicitation mechanisms are reported to mitigate the
difference between hypothetical and actual values. Finally, the primary factor that explains hypothetical
bias is, according to Murphy et al. (2005), the magnitude of the hypothetical value. Nevertheless, the
rationale of this ﬁnding is not clear without a well-developed theory of hypothetical bias.
3 Experiment Rationale and Hypotheses to Test
The literature review in the previous section shows that although some studies do not ﬁnd any statisti-
cally signiﬁcant hypothetical bias (Sinden 1988, Johannesson, Liljas, and Johansson 1998, Smith and
Mansﬁeld 1998, Cummings and Taylor 1999 and Balistreri et al. 2001) and several studies report a
negative hypothetical bias (McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey 1993, Johannesson, Liljas, and Johans-
son 1998 and Grifﬁn et al. 1995), people are likely to overstate their WTP in hypothetical situations
(e.g., Cummings, Harrison, and Rutstrom 1995, Loomis et al. 1997, List and Shogren 1998). The evi-
dence of the presence of positive hypothetical bias in valuation studies is so strong that, to counteract the
hypothetical bias, researchers have proposed different methods ranging from ‘numerical calibration’ to
‘verbal calibration’ (e.g., Cummings and Taylor 1999, Bulte et al. 2005).
While numerous traditional valuation studies have addressed the issue of a hypothetical bias, several
of its shortcomings seem to prevent one from dealing with the bias in an unambiguous way:
(1) Impossibility of comparing hypothetical and real values of a good on a ceteris paribus bases be-
cause the researcher is unable to actually provide the public good as required for the real choice
part. Using different elicitation mechanisms, say, the contingent valuation method (CVM) and the
hedonic price method (HPM) (a) may lead to unacceptable context differences and thus inference
contamination regarding the magnitude of hypothetical bias, and (b) is only feasible with goods
already being provided.
(2) Unfamiliarity of the good to respondents, lack of experience with it and/or its ‘remoteness’ (ex-
ample of the latter is rainforest in Costa Rica) result in a questionable value of this good for most
people and thus welfare changes from its consumption are hard to monetize (Diamond and Haus-
man 1994).
(3) Non-market valuation studies have often been criticized for framing contribution to the good as a
‘good thing to do’ (Diamond and Hausman 1994).
Non-market valuation researchers (e.g., Mitchell and Carson 1989; Sinden 1988; Fischhoff and
Furby 1988) have sought to establish conditions under which contingent valuation surveys yield valid es-
timates of the valuation of goods. The following issues need to be addressed in order to obtain unbiased
estimates of WTP values:
(1) For valuation purposes, the good must be well described and be meaningful, familiar, or of a
concern for respondents (Mitchell and Carson 1989, p.192; Sinden 1988, p.102; Bohm 1972,
p.116).
(2) The property rights and the market for the good must be described in such a way that the respon-
dents will accept the WTP format as plausible (Mitchell and Carson 1989, p.192; Bohm 1972,
4p.116).
(3) Valid estimates of the value of a good can only be obtained in the environment where individuals
are fully informed about possible choice alternatives, uncoerced, and able to identify their own
best interests (Bohm 1972, p.116; Fischhoff and Furby 1988, p.1).
The standard public goods game which deals with a well-described mechanism of making investments
in an abstract public good appears to satisfy all of these three criteria.
There is a history of using voluntary contribution games to improve the contingent valuation method
(CVM). Prince et al. (1992) appear to be the ﬁrst to investigate properties of a contribution game mech-
anism for the purpose of improving CVM. They simulate a ﬁeld survey in the laboratory in order to
investigate the performance of the contribution game mechanism. Bagnoli et al. (1992) show that the
standard contribution game induces a downward bias in aggregate WTP values with respect to WTP
reported in a standard contingent valuation framework. Research conducted by Prince et al. is directed
at ﬁnding ways that the value elicitation questions in CVM may be designed, in light of the performance
of the contribution game, and how the resulting data may be used to glean unbiased estimates of WTP
values for public goods. Several modiﬁcations are introduced to the contribution game in order to make
the laboratory setting more consistent with conditions that might exist in a survey used for valuing a
local public good.
Following the practice of modifying voluntary contribution games depending on tasks under inves-
tigation, we introduce two major modiﬁcations to the standard public goods game, which are described
in the next section. We design an experiment to rid of the aforementioned shortcomings and thus, to
minimize the chances of contaminating the test of hypothetical bias. The following hypothesis regarding
hypothetical bias will then be tested:
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the hypothetical and real values of
a laboratory public good in the experiment with the modiﬁed standard public goods game as
an elicitation mechanism. The alternative hypothesis is that the hypothetical and real values
of the good are different, with the direction of the difference unknown.
4 Design of Experiment
4.1 General Design
At the beginning of the game, each player receives ten tokens which can be invested in the private
Pocket, the common Pot, or left ‘uninvested’. The game is played in two steps. First, each player
allocates her endowed tokens according to her own preferences and understanding of the game. Once
each player submits her allocation, the computer determines what happens to the tokens. The computer
does not make any choices of its own but acts according to a pre-programmed set of rules. The computer
collects the choices of all players, draws random numbers, and reports game results to the players. The
experiment is conducted in a computerized laboratory where subjects anonymously interact with each
other. Players are requested to make token allocation decisions individually. No communication between
players is allowed during the game.
The game is constructed to reﬂect a real-life situation of making a choice between private purchases
(investments) and investing in a public good. The ‘Pocket’ represents the private sector of an economy
or can be thought of as a private good. The ‘Pot’ represents a public good. The standard public goods
game provides only two options for investing endowed tokens. They are usually named a ‘personal
account’ and a ‘public good’. In a standard public goods game, the personal account is not risky and is
similar to the ‘uninvested’ option in our experiment. This option is somewhat similar to a ‘choose none’
option in contingent valuation. Introducing the risky private Pocket where an investor, with stochastic
probabilities, can gain or lose makes the game more realistic. The Pot is also risky in the experiment
because the level of the public good that an individual desires can not be guaranteed to that individual.
That is, the individual may not attain her desired allocation of public and private goods due to collective
5decision making. The same risk is present in both standard public goods games and other valuation
studies.
There is a problem common to the valuation of those actual public goods which are imprecisely
deﬁned or unusual. In order to participate in a public goods game with a real good, subjects need to
have sufﬁcient experience with this good and to know their own WTP beforehand, without the necessity
to construct it or guess it on the ﬂy. Charitable contributions or ‘certiﬁcates’ of stewardship of envi-
ronmental resources, which are common public goods in valuation experiments, provide examples to
the contrary (Diamond and Hausman 1994). These deﬁne unusual and/or abstract goods and may be of
value only to a limited number of people from the general population. Money or tokens are easily un-
derstandable by any set of participants. According to neoclassical microeconomics, the marginal utility
of money is positive; that is, players consider money to be a desirable good. The underlying assumption
of our experiment is that marginal utility of both money and tokens is positive. The research question
is whether players differentiate between tokens in real rounds which can be exchanged for money (the
exchange rate is one token for one Canadian dollar) and tokens in hypothetical rounds which are not
exchangeable for money.6
Six consecutive rounds of the game are played by each player. A multiple-round game is chosen
over a one-round game because many real-world activities, including investment decisions, that have
aspects of risk, public good provision, and other social dilemmas are typically not one-time encounters,
but rather repeated undertakings (Levitt and List 2007).
Table 1: Description of Four Treatments
HRC RHC




Round 1 Hypothetical Real
Round 2 Real Hypothetical
Rounds 3–6 random random
There are two treatments used in the game, that we denote by HRC and RHC. Differences between
the treatments are explained in Table1, which is discussed below. Each player participates in one treat-
ment only. The ﬁrst six rounds consist of three hypothetical (H) and three real (R) rounds where players
have an option to invest any integer amount of tokens from 0 to 10 (in the ‘complete’ (C) version) or
where players have an option to invest only 0, 5, or 10 tokens (in the ‘short’ (S) version). Finally, the
seventh round is always real but the complexity is changed.7 For the complete version, players face the
reduced investment ﬂexibility—that is, they are allowed to invest only 0, 5, or 10 tokens in the last
round of the game. For the short version, players are offered the full investment ﬂexibility—that is,
6One common complaint about laboratory models is that they are not sufﬁciently realistic to engage fully the attention of the
participants. To mitigate this problem, we follow the dictates of experimental economics in using real monetary gains and losses.
Admittedly, these losses are triﬂing compared to real-world losses. Nevertheless, observations in the laboratory indicate that small
monetary losses are large enough so that everyone clearly prefers that the loss not happen. For example, subjects in the experiment
reacted with visible unhappiness whenever they lost money in the Pocket lottery. The presence of both tokens and dollars mimics a
traditional non-market valuation approach where hypothetical and real settings are distinguished by participants. This experiment
could have been done with monetary units only.
7This is done to compare real outcomes under different complexity scenarios forcing players’ homogeneity (each player makes
choices under both complexity levels). The results of the complexity treatments are not discussed in this paper.
6Figure 1: Screen Shots from the Game
7they are allowed to invest any integer number of tokens, from 0 to 10, in the last round of the game.
At the beginning of the ﬁrst round, players are aware that there are only four rounds where tokens are
eligible for money exchange (real rounds) and three rounds where they are not (hypothetical rounds). In
addition, players are aware which round is which when they start playing the rounds. They are not aware
of the change in complexity in the last round, which is needed to overcome the ‘rational expectations’
phenomenon (Muth 1961). If players had been fully informed about the change in complexity levels in
the last round then, according to rational expectations theory, they could have adjusted their strategies
beforehand and no difference in a person’s behavior would have been detected between the two different
complexity levels. For technical reasons, we chose to specify the order of rounds as follows. The ﬁrst
roundisalwayshypotheticalandthesecondroundisalwaysrealintheHRCandHRStreatments, andthe
ﬁrst round is always real and the second round is always hypothetical in the RHC and RHS treatments.
Results of the ﬁrst round become available for players only after the second round is played, together
with the second round results. By doing this we ensure that (1) subsequent hypothetical and real rounds
start with the same information (in other words, we ensure that no learning and/or strategy-adjustment
is possible between the ﬁrst two rounds), and (2) the ﬁrst two rounds are completely identical except for
the fact that the real round can be binding. The latter is crucial for the detection of hypothetical bias.
The order of the subsequent rounds 3–6 is determined randomly by the computer for both complete and
short versions of the game.
Each player starts each round with ten endowed tokens, and rounds are independent of each other.
Players may reallocate their endowed tokens in each round. Subjects are informed that the ﬁnal amount
of tokens that is redeemable for money is that from only one of the three real rounds. This restriction is a
standard means to reduce the costs of conducting an experiment. At the same time, we hope to minimize
any possible inﬂuence of strategic behavior on game results, which can arise when subjects are aware
in advance which real round is binding, by not revealing which real round will be used as the basis for
redeeming tokens.
Results for each round are generated instantaneously by the computer once everyone submits one’s
allocation. The result screen (available starting with the second round) shows each player’s submitted
allocation of tokens, payoffs for the Pocket, for the Pot, and for the ‘uninvested’ portion as well as the
total payoff (sum of the payoffs for the Pot, for the Pocket, and for the ‘uninvested’ portion), and a
step-by-step description of how the computer determined the payoffs in this round; see Figure1. No in-
formation on other players’ investment decisions or outcomes is provided for the following two reasons.
First, it can bias respondents’ allocation decisions in subsequent rounds. Secondly, a person in a real-life
choice situation is usually unaware of other people’s contributions for a public good.8 We chose to not
provide subjects with their own history of results from previous rounds because we believe that when
such a history is provided, respondents are further motivated towards strategic behavior. The goal of
this experiment is to extract respondents’ preferences towards a private good (the Pocket) and a public
good (the Pot) which, according to the conventional economic theory, are known to subjects before the
game begins. If this is true, the subjects should behave consistently throughout the experiment, in accor-
dance with their preferences. If this is not true, subjects may try to behave strategically. In either case,
providing the history of ﬁnal payoffs for each round risks introducing additional bias to the experiment.
4.2 Pocket and Pot Rules and Payoffs
The experiment has two investment options: the private Pocket and the common Pot. After players
submit their allocations, the computer uses a preprogrammed set of rules to determine what happens
with payers’ investments. Rules for the Pocket and the Pot are described below.
The Pocket represents a private sector of the economy or can be considered to be a private good.
There are equal chances (50:50) that the number of tokens in the Pocket will double, or that a player will
8The pledge drawn by the computer is the only piece of information which is revealed to all players and is related to other
player’s choices. Players potentially may adjust their investment decisions in subsequent rounds based on the pledge drawn by the
computer in previous rounds.
8lose half of the tokens she puts there. The lottery outcome is determined randomly, by the computer. The
risk associated with putting tokens in the Pocket is intended to parallel the investment risk in a real-life
situation. Pocket lottery outcome probabilities and outcomes (a stake doubles with probability 0.5 and
reduces by half with probability 0.5) were subjectively chosen, based on the following considerations:
² There is a need to motivate players to allocate all tokens between the Pocket and Pot rather than
leave tokens ‘uninvested’. It can jeopardize the objective of this study—to investigate the differ-
ence between the Pot/Pocket investments in hypothetical and real rounds—when the majority of
players leave their tokens ‘uninvested’. The expected payoff of the Pocket lottery is 1.25 times
higher than the amount invested. At the same time, the Pocket is characterized by stochastic risk
(that is, ambiguity). According to the theory of uncertainty, risk-loving and risk-neutral players
should prefer the option of investing their tokens to the Pocket rather than keeping them ‘unin-
vested’.
² Rules for computing the Pocket lottery outcome should be easy for players to understand and to
remember.
² The primarily goal of the experiment is to investigate the presence of hypothetical bias in the Pot
contributions. Therefore, one would want players’ contributions to the Pot to be in the interval (0,
10), conditional on the presence of the risky Pocket and risk-less ‘uninvested’ portion. As such,
the Pocket lottery should not be too attractive relative to the Pot. For this reason, the expected
payoff of the Pocket lottery is 1.25 which is 20% lower than the expected Pot payoff (1.5), given
that the Pot contribution gets drawn by the computer.9
Another investment option is the Pot, which represents a public good. After each participant person-
ally chooses how many tokens to put in her Pot, this amount becomes her pledge to the common pool.
The computer randomly draws one pledge out of all players’ pledges, collects this number of tokens from
each player, and places them in the common pool. In other words, the computer acts as a random dicta-
tor. Each pledge submitted by players has an equal probability of being drawn by the computer. Players
are informed that pledging is like voting: the chances of a particular pledge being drawn increases with
the number of players who pledged this amount. Once the pledge is determined, the computer increases
the number of tokens in the pool by 50%. This bonus imitates the production process.10 Finally, each
player gets back an equal share of tokens from the common pool.
If a player pledged more than the pledge drawn by the computer, the difference is reimbursed to the
player in the form of ‘uninvested’ tokens. When tokens are reimbursed to the player, they cannot be used
for the Pocket lottery. If the pledge submitted equals the pledge drawn, no reimbursement nor additional
tokens are provided/needed. If a player pledged less than the pledge drawn, the player must provide the
difference. First, ‘uninvested’ tokens are used to cover the deﬁcit. Any remaining balance is transferred
from the Pocket. Whatever remains in the Pocket is eligible for the Pocket lottery.
The Pot is characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. In this case, after a
pledge is drawn by the computer, each player gets an equal amount of tokens depending on the pledge
drawn. No one can be excluded from this redistribution. Everyone gets the same amount of tokens, that
is one’s consumption of this good does not reduce other players’ consumption.
9In the ﬁrst version of this game, the Pocket lottery odds were two to one, that is 67% chance of success versus 33% chance
of failure. Results obtained from the ﬁrst focus group showed that most of the players used the investment options fully, that is
invested either in the Pocket or in the Pot. The average percent of tokens invested in the Pocket was quite high (56%) relative to the
Pot contributions (41%). We decided to equate chances of success and failure in order to reduce the attractiveness of the Pocket as
an investment option.
10The production technology multiplier for the Pot contributions is chosen such that it is not too close to unity; 1.5 seems like a
reasonable number. At the same time, the production multiplier (1.5) is higher than the expected Pocket lottery multiplier (1.25).
Such a difference is needed to make the Pocket less attractive as an investment option compared to the Pot.
94.3 Random Dictatorship Mechanism
Introducing a random dictator is another step distancing the present game from the standard public
goods game. Introducing the random dictator eliminates the possibility of free-riding. In this game,
the random dictator is introduced in a sense that once the pledge is drawn by the computer, everyone
must provide this amount of tokens to the common pool. In other words, no free-riding is allowed.
The random dictatorship mechanism (RDM) is not implemented in the standard public goods games
because one of the goals of these games is to study free-riding or strategic behavior of players. In this
study, we use a modiﬁed standard public goods game as a tool (rather than the focus of the study) to
investigate hypothetical bias in public good contributions in the familiar-public-good and no-free-riding
environment. RDM is a strategy-proof mechanism (Gibbard 1977) in a one-round game: RDM does
not offer an individual incentives to misrepresent her preferences to secure a better personal outcome.
Gibbard’s proof regarding a one-round game can be extended to a multiple-round game similar to ours.
The knowledge of the pledge drawn by the computer in the previous round is the only information that
can motivate a player to misrepresent her preferences in the next round. If the player misrepresents her
preferences by mimicking her Pot contribution in the next round according to the pledge drawn by the
computer in the previous round, she gets the second best outcome which results in a lower utility level
and this person is not a utility maximizer. The utility maximizer would stick to her preferences and if her
Pot contribution gets drawn by the computer, she gets the ﬁrst best outcome which results in the highest
utility level. Under these conditions, RDM is strategy-proof in a several-round game such as ours. In
addition, Dutta, Peters, and Sen (2002) show that any strategy-proof (in Gibbard’s sense) and unanimous
mechanism must be a random dictatorship.
In addition, the random dictatorship mechanism, as opposed to majority voting and median voter
mechanisms, is characterized by the following aspects that are useful for this game:
² Compared to the majority voting mechanism, RDM is more convenient for games with many levels
of provision of a public good. The majority voting mechanism works well in the presence of two
levels of provision of a public good. In this game, there can be eleven different levels of provision
(from 0 to 10) in the complete version, and there can be three levels of provision (0, 5, or 10) in
the short version.
² Compared to the median voter mechanism, RDM appears to be easier to explain to participants.
The concept of the median may be hard to grasp for a subject not familiar with statistical concepts.
It should be noted that a random-dictator mechanism not only eliminates free-riding but also imposes
a non-voluntary contribution environment. But a non-voluntary contribution environment is not that
totally alien to the real world: in the real world, public goods are ﬁnanced using tax money. Taxes are
mandatory and the only way to free ride is tax evasion. Also, a random-dictator mechanism opens a
possibility to overrule the individual decision about one’s private investment (when a pledge drawn by
the computer is more than one’s pot contribution and uninvested tokens are not enough to cover the
deﬁcit) which is a limitation of the game.
4.4 Debrieﬁng Questionnaire
After the game is played, each subject is given a questionnaire which consists of two parts. The ﬁrst part
contains questions about the strategies adopted by players during the game and their risk attitudes. The
second part contains standard socio-demographic questions. In the ﬁrst part of the questionnaire, players
are asked to rate their attitude towards risk on the 11-point attitude rating (Likert) scale. The lower end-
point of 0 means that the respondent is extremely risk averse. The upper end-point of 10 means that the
respondent is extremely risk loving.
Six questions are asked about strategies adopted by players during the game. Again, an 11-point
Likert scale was used. The lower end-point of 0 means that the respondent completely disagreed with
the respective question. The upper end-point of 10 means that the respondent fully agreed with the re-
10spective question.11 Subjects are asked to rate the following statements: whether they were primarily
interested in maximizing the Pocket payoff; whether they were primarily interested in maximizing the
Pot payoff; whether they were interested in keeping their money safe; whether they used several strate-
gies during the game depending on the outcome of the previous round(s) (this question is asked to check
the consistency of preferences as well as the presence of strategic behavior); whether their choices were
purely random; and whether subjects found the Pocket to be riskier than the Pot (this question is asked
to collect information on risk perception towards the Pot).
Finally, players are asked whether, while listening to the game instructions, they had an impression
that the Pot had been presented as an alternative preferable to the Pocket on social, moral, or ethical
grounds. This question is aimed at capturing whether or not subjects exhibit ‘warm glow’ and/or com-
pliance bias while contributing to the Pot.12 To the best of our knowledge, instructions to the game are
written and presented in such a way to avoid any description of the Pot as a socially preferable alternative
compared to the Pocket. In other words, no bias is expected.
In the second part of the questionnaire, players are asked several socio-demographic questions re-
garding their gender, student/non-student status, department (if applicable), monthly living expenses,
presence of a part-time job, volunteer experience, and experiment participation experience.
5 Analysis of Experiment Results
5.1 Experiment Participants
In total, eight sessions of the experiment were held, two of each treatment. The number of participants
in a session ranged between 7 and 11, depending on how many of the invited subjects showed up for the
experiment. Each participant had an option to discontinue her participation at any time during the study,
althoughnobodyoptedout. Eachsubjectparticipatedinonlyoneofthefourexperimentaltreatments. All
sessions were held in February and March 2008, at the University of Alberta. Subjects were recruited
with the use of ORSEE—Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments, maintained by the
Department of Rural Economy, University of Alberta. This data base is used by the Department of Rural
Economy researchers for recruiting subjects for various experiments, games, and surveys. Experimental
sessions lasted about one hour and subjects earned, on average, CA$20–25, which included a show-up
fee of CA$5.
Subjects were either undergraduate or graduate students at the University of Alberta, with supposedly
little knowledge of economics. There may be a few disadvantages of using students for laboratory
experiments. Rosenthal and Rosnow (1969) note that student subjects are likely to be ‘scientiﬁc do-
gooders’, interested in the research, or students who readily cooperate with the experimenter and seek
social approval. On the other hand, List and Gallet (2001) as well as Murphy et al. (2005) ﬁnd that
student pools do not necessarily compromise the generality of empirical results. We believe that, for this
simple behavioral experiment with hard-to-guess objectives, the use of a student pool is legitimate and
should not negatively affect its results.
5.2 Token Allocations
Initial token allocations and round results averaged across players are presented in Table2. For the
complete version, players on average choose to invest more tokens in the Pot than the Pocket, by 1.53
and 2.26 tokens in hypothetical and real rounds, respectively. For the short version, players on average
11Note that the rating scale for these questions differs from that for the risk attitude question. As a result, the risk attitude ratings
will not be standardized, whereas responses for the other rating questions will be.
12Warm glow represents the purchase of moral satisfaction while contributing to the public good (Andreoni 1990). Players in
the present study may have contributed to the Pot because it is ‘a good thing to do’. Compliance bias would be committed by
individuals who did not ﬁnd the Pot attractive for investment purposes and had no intentions to contribute to the Pot but would still
contribute a positive amount to it in a belief that this is what experimenters expect them to do.
11choose to invest by 1.58 and 1.09 tokens more in the Pocket than the Pot in hypothetical and real rounds,
respectively.
To determine what could have attributed to the differences in investment behavior of players in dif-
ferent versions of the game, it would be useful to look at a detailed picture of players’ initial token
allocations across rounds and game versions, which is discussed later in this section.
Round results—UnOut, PockOut, and PotOut (see Table2)—calculated for each player are affected
by the initial token allocation made by the player as well as other players’ Pot contributions. Therefore,
round results are not mutually independent due to the experiment construction. The violation of the
assumption of mutually independent observations makes it impossible to analyze the results of each
round using statistical tests. Initial allocations, on the other hand, are mutually independent, which
places no restriction on the statistical tests implementation.
For the purpose of analyzing experimental results, non-parametric techniques are chosen over para-
metric methods. Application of parametric methods requires a number of assumptions regarding distri-
butionsofvariablesunderconsideration. Theseassumptionscanhardlybeprovidedwithoutaformalized
theory on hypothetical bias. In addition, there are several reasons for the ineffectiveness of regression
analysis applied to the obtained data. First, the linearity in explanatory variables is a convenient but often
unrealistic assumption. In case of a non-linear regression, which non-linear function should be used to
model the data collected in the experiment? There is no theory to help us ﬁnd the correct non-linear form
of the model. Second, the size of our data set is quite small for regression purposes (forty two players
for the complete version and thirty seven players for the short version). Finally, regression analysis deals
with the partialing-out effect of one explanatory variable under consideration, keeping other variables
constant. The lack of variation in the latter due the the small sample size makes partialing-out rather
questionable (yet computationally possible).
A detailed picture of Pot contributions, Pocket investments, and uninvested tokens across round pairs
for different game versions is presented in Figures2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Figure2 provides information on the complete and short version strategies regarding contributions
to the Pot across round pairs. Players’ Pot investment behavior is somewhat similar in the ﬁrst pair
of hypothetical/real rounds for both versions: ﬁve tokens is the most popular Pot contribution in both
hypothetical and real rounds and in both complete and short versions of the experiment. But it seems
that the complete version players are more likely to invest a non-zero number of tokens in the Pot than
are the short version players.
As the game proceeds, the short version players appear to lose their interest in the Pot. For the second
pair of hypothetical/real rounds in the complete version, a majority of players prefer to put ten or seven
or six tokens in the Pot in a hypothetical round, whereas they put ﬁve or ten tokens there in a real round.
In the third pair of rounds, the bulk of the players put zero or six tokens in the Pot in a hypothetical round
and seven or ten tokens in a real round. For the short version, a majority of the players prefer to put zero
or ﬁve tokens in the Pot in both hypothetical and real rounds up until the end of the game.
Figure3 shows the complete and short version strategies with respect to Pocket investments across
round pairs. For the ﬁrst pair of rounds in the short version, a majority of players put ﬁve tokens in the
Pocket in a hypothetical round, whereas they put zero tokens there in a real one. A similar picture is
observed for the complete version players: a majority of them put two or ﬁve tokens in the Pocket in a
hypothetical round and zero tokens in a real round.
Players’ investment behavior appears to change starting with the second pair of hypothetical/real
rounds. The majority of the short version players put ﬁve or ten tokens in the Pocket in both hypothetical
and real rounds until the end of the game. The bulk of the complete version players put from zero to ﬁve
tokens in the Pocket in hypothetical and real rounds until the end of the game. In other words, there is a
striking difference in players’ attitude towards the Pocket in the complete and short versions of the game
that emerges in the second pair of hypothetical/real rounds and then goes on. The short version players
seem to prefer making high Pocket investments whereas the complete version players are less likely to
do so.

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The horizontal axis shows all possible numbers of tokens to be allocated to the Pot; the percentage breakdown of the
total of 42 (complete version) and 37 (short version) players is shown on the vertical axis. The numbers denote the
percentages of players who contributed the respective numbers of tokens to the Pot. The numbers below, in parentheses,
are actual token counts. 1H/1R, 2H/2R, and 3H/3R denote ﬁrst, second, and third pairs of (H)ypothetical/(R)eal rounds,
respectively.
































































































































































































































The horizontal axis shows all possible numbers of tokens to be allocated to the Pocket; the percentage breakdown of the
total of 42 (complete version) and 37 (short version) players is shown on the vertical axis. The numbers denote the per-
centages of players who contributed the respective numbers of tokens to the Pocket. The numbers below, in parentheses,
are actual token counts. 1H/1R, 2H/2R, and 3H/3R denote ﬁrst, second, and third pairs of (H)ypothetical/(R)eal rounds,
respectively.





















































































































































































































































The horizontal axis shows all possible numbers of tokens to be left uninvested; the percentage breakdown of the total of
42 (complete version) and 37 (short version) players is shown on the vertical axis. The numbers denote the percentages
of players who left the respective numbers of tokens uninvested. The numbers below, in parentheses, are actual token
counts. 1H/1R, 2H/2R, and 3H/3R denote ﬁrst, second, and third pairs of (H)ypothetical/(R)eal rounds, respectively.
16tokens for the complete and short versions of the game. For the short version, players prefer to leave
zero or ﬁve tokens uninvested in both hypothetical and real rounds. For the complete version, the number
of uninvested tokens varies from zero to three, depending on the round.
Figures2 to 4 show that token allocations in the Pot and the Pocket are very similar for the ﬁrst pair
of hypothetical/real rounds for the complete and short version players. It appears that the short version
players focused on the Pocket (lost interest in the Pot) starting with the second pair of hypothetical/real
rounds. There is a possible explanation to this observation. Players are allowed to invest 0, 5, or 10
tokens in the short version. These investment options may not fully reﬂect players’ preferences which,
combined with the trade-off between the stochastic risk in the Pocket and the risk associated with other
players’ choices for the Pot, may have resulted in relatively low Pot investments and relatively high
Pocket investments. Also, players invest the largest portion of their initial endowments in the Pocket
and the Pot, leaving none or almost no tokens uninvested in both versions of the game. In addition, the
short version players seem to be able to ﬁnd the preferable strategy faster and thus achieve ‘convergence’
faster (possibly because of the limited investment ﬂexibility). It takes longer for the complete version
players to achieve ‘convergence’ (possibly because of the high investment ﬂexibility which is exploited
by the players at an increasing rate as they proceed through the game).
Analysis of Table2 and Figures2 to 4 can be used to examine the difference in players’ Pot and
Pocket investment behavior between the complete and short versions of the game. Is the group playing
the complete version different from the group playing the short version? In an attempt to answer this
question, the following null hypothesis was tested using the Friedman test for nine factors:13
H0 : Complete factor = Short factor versus H1 : Complete factor 6= Short factor:
The null hypothesis is that the two groups are not different in terms of their rating responses for a speciﬁc
factor; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference. The nine factors considered are:
² risk which denotes player’s attitude towards risk;
² maxPock which represents a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff;
² maxPot which is a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pot/pool payoff;
² safe which is a strategy that focuses on keeping a player’s money safe;
² strMany which is a strategy that focuses on applying many different strategies during the game;
² random which is a strategy of making random choices;
² riskPock which indicates risk perception towards Pocket/Pot;
² complex that denotes which investment option—complete or short—players found to be easier
to make; and
² bias which represents if players found any social, moral or ethical bias in the Pot instructions.
Before proceeding with the hypothesis testing, it should be noted that forty two players participated
in the complete version of the game and thirty seven participated in the short version. To perform the
Friedman test, the number of players participating in both versions should be equal. Thus we reduced
the number of players who participated in the complete version of the game down to thirty seven by
performing a random sampling without replacement. Then, the Friedman tests were conducted to check
the null hypotheses stated above. To minimize the possibility of sampling errors, we performed the
Friedman test 1,000 times for each factor (each time with a new sample of thirty seven observations out
of forty two for the complete version). As a result, a distribution of the Friedman test p-values for each
factor considered was obtained; see Figure5. Unfortunately, no rigorous statistical analysis is possible at
13The Friedman test is a nonparametric statistical test used to detect differences in treatments (in this case, game versions) across
multiple mutually independent observations. The procedure involves ranking each observation within rows, then considering the
sums of ranks by columns. The approximate distribution of the Friedman test statistic is Â
2 with degrees of freedom equal to the
number of treatments used in the test minus one (Conover 1999).
17this stage because the distribution of p-values, even if it exists, is unknown. For each factor considered,
we computed the number of p-values that are less than or equal to 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 (Table3). This
gives us an idea of how many Friedman tests out of 1,000 conducted for each factor rejected the null
hypothesis for the three different signiﬁcance levels. The conclusion of whether a particular number of
rejections of the null hypothesis is large or ‘normal’ is subjective. Table3 shows a suspiciously high
number of p-values falling in the rejection region at 5% and 10% signiﬁcance levels for the three factors:
maxPock, maxPot, and complex. For maxPock, the number of p-values falling in the rejection region
at 1% signiﬁcance level seems to be very high. Thus, it can be suspected that players adopt different
strategies regarding their Pocket and Pot investments in the complete and the short versions of the game.
In addition, there is a chance that choice ﬂexibility in terms of the number of tokens allowed to be
invested is viewed differently by players who participated in different game versions.
Although these ﬁndings are not based on a statistical test, they nonetheless have implications that
need to be taken into consideration for further analysis. Analyzing hypothetical bias, the difference in
investment behavior for the complete and the short versions of the game must be explained.
5.3 Heterogeneity in Rating Responses
Even though each player was given the same number of endowed tokens at the beginning of each round,
we assume that people differ across their preferences, decision-making abilities, and other factors. Player
homogeneity is not to be expected in an experiment like this; therefore, any inter-personal comparisons
should be implemented with caution. In an attempt to control to some degree for the presence of such
differences, each player was asked to complete a debrieﬁng questionnaire after the game. This ques-
tionnaire contains several questions involving the use of a rating scale. Any inter-personal comparisons
made using scale ratings should implement controls for scale usage heterogeneity.14 No corrections
for the scale usage heterogeneity or players’ responses are needed when intra-personal comparisons are
made.
14It has been known for a long time that respondents vary in their usage of the scale (Cronbach 1946; Lentz 1938). For instance,
some subjects tend to use the upper portion of the scale, others use its lower or middle portions. These content-irrelevant factors of
responding are referred to as ‘scale usage heterogeneity’. The heterogeneity brings additional noise to models describing data and
can signiﬁcantly contaminate results.































































































































































The Friedman test on the equality of factor effects for the complete version and the short version of the game is con-
ducted 1,000 times. Nine factors are considered: ‘risk’ denotes players’ attitude towards risk, ‘maxPock’ represents
a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff; ‘maxPot’ is a strategy that focuses on maximizing
the Pot/pool payoff; ‘safe’ is a strategy that focuses on keeping a player’s money safe; ‘strMany’ is a strategy that
focuses on applying many different strategies during the game; ‘random’ is a strategy of making random choices;
‘riskPock’ indicates risk perception towards Pocket/Pot; ‘complex’ denotes which investment option—complete or
short—players found to be easier to make; and ‘bias’ represents if players found any social, moral or ethical bias in
the Pot instructions.
19Table 3: Number of P-values No Greater Than 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10 for Nine Factors
Factora Number of p-values ·
0.01 0.05 0.10
risk 0 0 7
maxPock 193 567 793
maxPot 6 96 246
safe 0 22 67
strMany 1 25 60
random 0 0 4
riskPock 0 2 9
complex 1 90 245
bias 0 0 0
a Mnemonic ‘risk’ denotes players’ attitude towards risk, ‘maxPock’ repre-
sents a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff; ‘max-
Pot’ is a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pot/pool payoff; ‘safe’ is a
strategythatfocusesonkeepingaplayer’smoneysafe; ‘strMany’isastrategy
that focuses on applying many different strategies during the game; ‘random’
is a strategy of making random choices; ‘riskPock’ indicates risk perception
towards Pocket/Pot; ‘complex’ denotes which investment option—complete
or short—players found to be easier to make; and ‘bias’ represents if players
found any social, moral or ethical bias in the Pot instructions.
The standard approach to control for scale usage heterogeneity is to standardize responses within
each subject:
Rij ¡ ¹ Ri
¾(Ri)
; (1)
where Rij is a rating response of i-th subject on j-th question, ¹ Ri and ¾(Ri) are the average rating
response and the standard deviation of responses of i-th subject, respectively.
The rating scale for the risk attitude question (risk) differs from that for the other rating questions
in the questionnaire. For this question, players are asked to rate their attitude towards risk on the 11-
point attitude rating (Likert) scale. The lower end-point of 0 means that the respondent is extremely risk
averse. The upper end-point of 10 means that the respondent is extremely risk loving. Players are asked
to rate six more questions regarding strategies they adopted during the game. An 11-point Likert scale is
used again. The lower end-point of 0 means that the respondent completely disagreed with the respective
question. The upper end-point of 10 means that the respondent fully agreed with the respective question.
Note that the rating scale for these questions differs from that for the risk attitude question. As a result,
rating responses to the risk attitude question cannot be standardized, while ratings from the other rating
questions can.
The distributions of rating responses for the risk attitude question in both game versions are presented
in Figure6. Although graphs in Figure6 do not look alike, analysis of quantiles from the distribution of
responses shows that players have similar risk attitudes in both complete and short versions of the game;
20see Table4.15
Table4 shows that the complete version players are very similar to the short version players in terms
of responses to the three questions: application of different strategies during the game (strMany), prac-
ticing random choices (random), and players’ risk perception towards Pocket/Pot (riskPock). But, when
comparing the other three questions—maximizing the Pocket (maxPock) and the Pot (maxPot) payoffs
and keeping money safe (safe)—the short version players prefer maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff
and keeping their money safe whereas, the complete version players prefer maximizing the Pot payoff.
For the graphical representation of this conclusion, see Figures7and8.
The distribution of the standardized rating responses for different questionnaire questions for the
complete version and the short version of the game are presented in Figure7 and Figure8, respectively.
While analyzing these ﬁgures, we are looking to see whether bimodality is present in responses. This
knowledge will help us to validate a certain conjecture put forward by Champ et al. (1997) and Champ
and Bishop (2001). Some authors suggested that hypothetical bias was manifested by an identiﬁable
group of subjects, hence bimodality in their data. If bimodality is suspected in the rating responses
provided by players participated in our experiment, it can be conjectured that the players can be split
in two groups with different behavioral patterns. These behavioral differences can result in different
patterns of rating responses which, in turn, may be causing the seeming bimodality.
Unfortunately, the exact distribution of the rating responses, even if it exists, is unknown. As a result,
no statistically valid bimodality check is possible here. For the complete version (Figure7), it appears
that rating responses to three questions—maxPock, random, and riskPock—may exhibit bimodality.
Fortheshortversion(Figure8), ratingresponsestotwoquestions—randomandriskPock—mayexhibit
bimodality.
In addition to the scale usage heterogeneity, non-contingent responding should be addressed. Finally,
although somewhat belatedly, we are interested in determining whether rating responses obtained from
players are meaningful and so the analysis of it (as above) potentially useful. We need to be conﬁdent
that there is not non-contingent responding (NCR) when NCR, as characterized by Baumgartner and
Steenkamp (2001), is the tendency to respond to questions carelessly, randomly, or non-purposefully.
There is no conventional way to check for NCR as it depends on the nature of data collected. To provide
an analysis here, we chose to compute Kendall’s concordance measure between the average difference in
the Pot and Pocket investments and rating responses (Table5).16 If signs and signiﬁcance of concordance
coefﬁcients are consistent with the logic of common sense (see discussion below), we can conclude that
responses are meaningful and can be used for further analysis.
Results presented in Table5 demonstrate that players’ responses follow common sense: more risk-
loving players as well as those attracted to Pocket lottery outcomes preferred to invest more in the Pocket
than the Pot; those who wanted to keep their money safe as well as those who wanted to cash in on Pot
outcomes preferred investing more in the Pot relative to the Pocket. The signs and signiﬁcance of the
concordance coefﬁcients between hypothetical and real rounds show the consistency of players’ behavior
acrossroundtypes. Realroundcoefﬁcientsforsomefactorsexhibitastrongerstatisticalsigniﬁcancethan
those from hypothetical rounds, implying that players distinguished between the two types of rounds and
may have behaved differently (e.g., players may have used hypothetical rounds to experiment in attempts
15Quantile is the percent (or fraction) of points below the given value. That is, the 30% (or 0.3) quantile is the point at which
30% percent of the data fall below and 70% fall above that value. Quantiles are points taken at regular intervals from the cumulative
distribution function of a random variable.
16Kendall’s concordance ¿ is a nonparametric association measure for a pair of variables, similar in concept to correla-
tion (Conover 1999). The measure ranges between ¡1 and 1. Positive values (concordance) indicate that greater values of one
variable (X) correspond to greater values of the other one (Y). Negative values (discordance) indicate the opposite. The advantage
of using Kendall’s ¿ over Pearson’s correlation measure r is that the distribution of r depends on the bivariate distribution function
of (X,Y). Therefore r has no value as a test statistic in nonparametric tests unless the distribution of (X,Y) is known. Kendall’s ¿
is based on the order (ranks) of the observations rather than the numbers themselves, and the distribution of the measure does not
depend on the distribution of (X,Y). Additionally, correlation is a measure of linear dependence, whereas Kendall’s concordance
only measures association, no matter what form it takes.






























































An 11-point attitude rating (Likert) scale is the horizontal axis (0 means that the respondent is extremely risk averse; 10
means that the respondent is extremely risk loving). Numbers of players are shown on the vertical axis. The total number




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Standardized 11-point attitude rating (Likert) scale is the horizontal axis (the lower end-point means that the respondent completely
disagreed with the respective question; the upper end-point means that the respondent fully agreed with the respective question).
Numbers of players are shown on the vertical axis. The total number of players is 42. ‘maxPock’ represents a strategy that focuses
on maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff; ‘maxPot’ is a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pot/pool payoff; ‘safe’ is a strategy
that focuses on keeping a player’s money safe; ‘strMany’ is a strategy that focuses on applying many different strategies during the
game; ‘random’ is a strategy of making random choices; ‘riskPock’ indicates risk perception towards Pocket/Pot.






















































































































































































Standardized 11-point attitude rating (Likert) scale is the horizontal axis (the lower end-point means that the respondent completely
disagreed with the respective question; the upper end-point means that the respondent fully agreed with the respective question).
Numbers of players are shown on the vertical axis. The total number of players is 37. ‘maxPock’ represents a strategy that focuses
on maximizing the Pocket lottery payoff; ‘maxPot’ is a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pot/pool payoff; ‘safe’ is a strategy
that focuses on keeping a player’s money safe; ‘strMany’ is a strategy that focuses on applying many different strategies during the
game; ‘random’ is a strategy of making random choices; ‘riskPock’ indicates risk perception towards Pocket/Pot.
25Table 5: Non-Contingent Responding. Kendall’s Concordance Coefﬁcients
Between Average (Pot¡Pocket) Investments and Rating Responses
Complete Version Short Version
Factors Hypothetical Real Hypothetical Real
rounds rounds rounds rounds
risk ¡0.2928*** ¡0.3014*** ¡0.1621 ¡0.0736
(0.0097) (0.0079) (0.2021) (0.5567)
maxPock ¡0.3885*** ¡0.5388*** ¡0.1354 ¡0.3790***
(0.0003) (0.0001) (0.2639) (0.0015)
maxPot 0.2132** 0.4079*** 0.0999 0.3411***
(0.0495) (0.0001) (0.4096) (0.0043)
safe 0.2321** 0.3629*** 0.1805 0.1106
(0.0325) (0.0008) (0.1363) (0.3554)
strMany ¡0.1577 ¡0.2505** 0.0999 0.1390
(0.1458) (0.0212) (0.4096) (0.2453)
random 0.0436 ¡0.1099 0.0451 ¡0.0853
(0.6880) (0.3122) (0.7096) (0.4759)
riskPock 0.1342 0.1630 ¡0.2869** ¡0.0663
(0.2160) (0.1337) (0.0179) (0.5792)
bias ¡0.1793 ¡0.0118 ¡0.0703 0.0511
(0.1699) (0.9284) (0.6296) (0.7223)
‘risk’ denotes players’ attitude towards risk; ‘maxPock’ represents a strategy that focuses on max-
imizing the Pocket lottery payoff; ‘maxPot’ is a strategy that focuses on maximizing the Pot/pool
payoff; ‘safe’ is a strategy that focuses on keeping a player’s money safe; ‘strMany’ is a strategy
that focuses on applying many different strategies during the game; ‘random’ is a strategy of mak-
ing random choices; ‘riskPock’ indicates risk perception towards Pocket/Pot; and ‘bias’ represents
if players found any social, moral or ethical bias in the Pot instructions. p-values are in parentheses.
***, **, and * denote estimates signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance levels, respectively.
26to learn about how the game worked or other players behaved). One possible explanation of the many
insigniﬁcant concordance coefﬁcients in the short version is the insufﬁcient variation in the Pocket/Pot
investments due to the limited number of possible outcomes. The overall result indicates that allocations
are contingent on rating responses, that is, players seem to have answered the questionnaire questions
carefully and meaningfully.
5.4 Hypothetical Bias
Result 1 A statistically signiﬁcant negative hypothetical bias is found between the ﬁrst hypothetical
round and the ﬁrst real round. The bias in the subsequent second and third hypothetical/real pairs is not
statistically signiﬁcant. The hypothetical bias magnitude oscillates around zero and converges to zero as
the experiment progresses.
Given the data collected in the experiment, hypothetical bias for the Pot contributions can be mea-
sured in two ways: as an absolute measure and as a relative measure that is relative to the Pocket invest-




where H and R denote hypothetical and real rounds, respectively, and Pot stands for the Pot contribu-
tions.
The relative hypothetical bias of the i-th player is the hypothetical bias for the difference of Pot and
Pocket investments (RHBi):
RHBi = (Pot ¡ Pocket)H
i ¡ (Pot ¡ Pocket)R
i ; (3)
where H and R indicate hypothetical and real rounds, respectively, and (Pot¡Pocket) is the difference
between the Pot and Pocket investments.
We conducted analysis using both measures of hypothetical bias and ﬁnd that they always produce
similarresults(seeFigure9asanexample). Therelativemeasureofhypotheticalbiasseemsmorenatural
because it shows how substitution between public (the Pot) and private (the Pocket) investments changes
from hypothetical to real choices. Thus, results for the RHB measure are presented in the paper; results
pertaining to the AHB measure are presented whenever they are crucial to one’s understanding of a task
under consideration or are different compared to the RHB measure. The choice in favor of the difference
between the Pot and Pocket investments rather than their ratio in Equation (3) can be explained by the
fact that both Pot and Pocket investments can take zero values.
Evidence in support of Result1 is presented in Figure9 and Table6. In Figure9, the presence of
negative hypothetical bias for the ﬁrst pair of hypothetical/real rounds in the complete as well as the
short version of the game is observed. The bias sign is reversed for the second pair of rounds in both
versions. For the third pair of hypothetical/real rounds, hypothetical bias disappears in the short version
but its negative sign is restored in the complete version. In other words, it looks like hypothetical bias
oscillates around zero and converges to some steady-state (possibly zero). This observation is true for
both measures of hypothetical bias as well as both versions of the game. The resemblance between AHB
and RHB magnitudes and signs tells us that the presence/absence of hypothetical bias is robust to the
change in the hypothetical bias measure.
To check the statistical signiﬁcance of the bias detected for each pair of rounds, the following null
and alternative hypotheses were formulated and the former tested using the Friedman test:
H0 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) = Real (Pot¡Pocket)
versus
H1 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) 6= Real (Pot¡Pocket):
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Shown numbers are relative hypothetical bias values averaged across players.
Numbers in parenthesis are absolute hypothetical bias values averaged across








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between (Pot¡Pocket) investments in hypothetical and
real rounds; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference.17
Results of the Friedman test are presented in Table6. These show the presence of a statistically
signiﬁcant negative hypothetical bias only for the ﬁrst pair of hypothetical/real rounds in both versions
of the game. RHB is signiﬁcant at the 10% signiﬁcance level for the complete version whereas, for the
short version, it is signiﬁcant at the 5% signiﬁcance level. For the second and third round pairs, the bias
is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The above ﬁndings trigger two questions. First, why does statistically signiﬁcant hypothetical bias
only exist for the ﬁrst hypothetical/real round pair and then disappear in the consecutive rounds tending
to converge towards zero (Figure9)? Second, why is the bias negative in the ﬁrst pair? That is, why
do players systematically put more tokens in the Pot in the ﬁrst real round relative to those in the ﬁrst
hypothetical round?
Result 2 The possible explanation of the presence of hypothetical bias based on players’ limited expe-
rience with the game in the ﬁrst pair of rounds does not seem to be supported by the data. This result is
conditional on the choice of variance/standard deviation as an experience measure.
One possible explanation for the absence of any statistically signiﬁcant hypothetical bias in the sec-
ond and third hypothetical/real round pairs is that players might have gained some experience with the
game, which affected their token allocations. A similar explanation was offered in an experiment con-
ducted by McClelland, Schulze, and Coursey (1993). This study involves risk and purchases of insurance
polices and does not refer to public good contributions. The authors found that inexperienced hypotheti-
cal bids can underestimate actual auction bids (hence a negative hypothetical bias), whereas experienced
hypothetical bids can either overestimate actual bids or be equal (that is, hypothetical bias is positive
with those players or there is no bias at all). Put otherwise, practice with the auction mechanism and
experience with risk may eliminate hypothetical bias. The reader is reminded that, in our experiment,
no results are reported to players until both hypothetical/real or real/hypothetical rounds are completed
in the ﬁrst pair of rounds (where hypothetical bias has been detected). Players’ experience thus has the
associated learning limit.
Since the experiment setup did not contain any facility to track changes in experience (learning) of
players as they moved through the game, there is a need to come up with a proxy measure for the experi-
ence/learning factor. Tumer and Wolpert (2004) and Wolpert and Tumer (2001) suggest a ‘learnability’
property that measures the sensitivity of an agent’s utility to the agent’s own strategy versus the strate-
gies of others. A low learnability (characteristic to inexperienced players) would result in a smaller role
of one’s own decision criteria and a high sensitivity to the perceived strategies of others. In a dynamic
setting, this should arguably cause higher volatility in choices made by that agent. On the other hand,
experimentation with one’s own preferences should also lead to an agent’s low learnability, now because
of the smaller role of the utility part. In either case, variance (or standard deviation) as a measure of
dispersion in the group of players should then work as a reasonable measure of players’ experience.
To explore the supposition that players, as a group, became more game experienced as they moved
through the game, the following two hypotheses were put forward:
H0 : Hypothetical ¾12 = Hypothetical ¾23 versus H1 : Hypothetical ¾12 6= Hypothetical ¾23;
H0 : Real ¾12 = Real ¾23 versus H1 : Real ¾12 6= Real ¾23:
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the standard deviation (¾) of the respective
factor calculated for the ﬁrst and the second hypothetical rounds and that calculated for the second and
17In addition, the following null hypothesis was tested by the Friedman test:
H0 : Hypothetical Pot = Real Pot versus H1 : Hypothetical Pot 6= Real Pot:
ThenullhypothesisisthatthereisnodifferencebetweenPotcontributionsinhypotheticalandrealrounds; thealternativehypothesis
is that there is a difference. The test results (not presented here) are in line with the results presented in Table6.
30the third hypothetical rounds; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference (Friedman test). The
second null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the the respective factor’s ¾ calculated
for the ﬁrst and second real rounds and that calculated for the second and the third real rounds; the
alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference. Three factors are considered: Pot contributions, Pocket
investments, and the difference between the Pot and Pocket investments. The Friedman test is a pair-wise
test, thus, for each player, ¾12 is computed between investments made in the ﬁrst and the second rounds
by a player. Similarly, ¾23 is computed between investments made in the second and the third rounds
by each player. Results, presented in Table7, suggest that the null hypothesis for all tests should not be
rejected. In other words, there is no evidence that hypothetical as well as real standard deviations of the
three factors considered diminish as players proceed through the game. Thus, the conjecture that players
become more focused during the game is not supported by the data.18 On the other hand, it is possible
that the variance measure does not really capture the idea of focusing and learning as players proceed
through the game.
Table 7: Test for Differences in Standard Deviations in Consecutive Hypothetical and Real
Rounds for Three Factors
Complete Version Short Version
Factors St.dev. St.dev. Friedman St.dev. St.dev. Friedman
1:2a 2:3b Statisticc 1:2 2:3 Statistic
Pot Contributions:
Hypothetical rounds 1.58 1.46 0.8621 2.58 2.39 0.1667
(0.3532) (0.6831)
Real rounds 1.09 0.98 0.0400 1.53 1.82 0.4737
(0.8415) (0.4913)
Pocket Investments:
Hypothetical rounds 1.56 1.58 0.0345 2.87 2.68 0.4286
(0.8527) (0.5127)
Real rounds 1.09 0.96 0.0526 1.53 1.62 0.0000
(0.8185) (1.0000)
Pot¡Pocket:
Hypothetical rounds 3.08 3.05 0.1250 5.45 5.06 0.1667
(0.7237) (0.6831)
Real rounds 2.09 1.90 0.3913 3.06 3.44 0.0476
(0.5316) (0.8273)
a Standard deviation is computed between the ﬁrst and the second rounds.
b Standard deviation is computed between the second and the third rounds.
c The Friedman test p-values are in parentheses.
18In addition, it was tested if the standard deviation of the considered factors decreases as players proceed through the game
regardless of the round type. That is, the following hypothesis was tested:
H0 : ¾i = ¾i+1 versus H1 : ¾i 6= ¾i+1;
where i 2 [1;6] and i + 1 indicate the current and the next round, respectively, regardless of whether it is a hypothetical or a real
round. Test results (not presented) do not support the conjecture that players, as a group, become more focused during the game.
31To test whether players might have systematically experimented with investments in hypothetical
rounds and were more careful with those in real rounds, the following null hypothesis is tested:
H0 : Hypothetical ¾ = Real ¾ versus H1 : Hypothetical ¾ 6= Real ¾:
This null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the respective factor’s ¾ in hypothetical and
real rounds; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference (Friedman test). Three factors are
considered: Pot contributions, Pocket investments, and the difference between the Pot and Pocket in-
vestments. Results, presented in Table8, suggest that the standard deviation of both Pot and Pocket
investments as well as their difference is greater in hypothetical rounds than that in real rounds. The
implication is that players, as a group, varied their investment decisions more in hypothetical rounds
than real rounds throughout the game. It can be conjectured that players experimented more with the
Pot/Pocket investments in hypothetical rounds compared to real rounds, including situations when they
tried to ‘outsmart’ or mislead other players; or players simply focused less in hypothetical rounds making
more random choices.
Table 8: Test for Differences in Standard Deviation in Hypothetical and Real Rounds for
Three Factors
Complete Version Short Version
Factors Hypoth. Real Friedman Hypoth. Real Friedman
st.dev.a st.dev.b Statisticc st.dev. st.dev. Statistic
Pot Contributions 1.88 1.23 10.939 2.97 2.04 8.048
(0.0009) (0.0046)
Pocket Investments 2.03 1.21 15.114 3.21 2.09 9.800
(0.0001) (0.0017)
Pot¡Pocket 3.79 2.33 16.000 6.15 4.03 8.167
(0.0001) (0.0043)
a Standard deviation is computed across three hypothetical rounds.
b Standard deviation is computed across three real rounds.
c The Friedman test p-values are in parentheses.
To summarize, the statistical tests on standard deviations conducted in this section give an impression
that players, in both versions of the game, chose statistically different Pot/Pocket investment strategies
in hypothetical and real rounds but did not signiﬁcantly change these strategies throughout the game.
5.5 Exploratory Factor Analysis for Hypothetical Bias
Result 3 The grouping of players by their risk perception toward the Pocket/Pot reveals that those who
found the Pot to be riskier than the Pocket demonstrate a signiﬁcant hypothetical bias regardless of what
round of the game being played. Those players who found the Pocket to be riskier than the Pot did not
demonstrate any hypothetical bias at all. In addition, the hypothesis that people exhibit hypothetical
bias as a result of purchasing moral satisfaction and/or of compliance bias does not seem to be fully
supported by the data.
In order to ﬁnd factors responsible for the presence of hypothetical bias in the ﬁrst hypothetical/real
pair of rounds and its absence from subsequent round pairs, we calculate Kendall’s pair-wise concor-
dance coefﬁcients for the relative hypothetical bias (Equation3) and socio-demographic variables as
32well as for the absolute hypothetical bias (Equation2) and socio-demographic variables for the complete
and short versions. Results presented in Table9 indicate that, for the complete version of the game, the
factor of part-time job and the frequency of volunteering are signiﬁcantly concordant with both relative
and absolute hypothetical bias for the third pair of hypothetical/real rounds. Concordance results for the
short version are presented in Table10. The table shows that the frequency of volunteering is signiﬁ-
cantly concordant with both relative and absolute hypothetical bias in the second pair of hypothetical/real
rounds, and living expenditures is signiﬁcantly concordant with both measures of the bias in the third
pair of hypothetical/real rounds. No concordance coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant for the ﬁrst pair of hypo-
thetical/real rounds for both game versions, which means little can be inferred from these results that
would help to explain the presence of hypothetical bias in the ﬁrst pair of rounds and its absence later
on.
To investigate further the occurrence of hypothetical bias, concordance between the relative or abso-
lute hypothetical bias and scale ratings of attitude towards risk and different strategies (as were reported
by players in the exit questionnaire) was computed for both complete and short versions. For the com-
plete version (Table9), two factors—the risk perception towards Pocket/Pot (riskPock) and the presence
of social, moral, or ethical bias (bias)—are signiﬁcantly concordant with both measures of hypothetical
bias in the ﬁrst hypothetical/real pair and marginally concordant or not concordant with the bias in the
later rounds. Kendall’s concordance coefﬁcients between these factors and any measure of hypothetical
bias are not statistically signiﬁcant for the short version of the game (Table10).
Notice that the signiﬁcance of concordance coefﬁcients for the short version is measure-dependent,
that is, there are a few coefﬁcients—expenditures, risk, maxPock, and maxPot—that are signiﬁcant for
the relative hypothetical bias measure but are not for the absolute measure. Conventionally, whenever
implications of some results depend on the measure chosen to obtain those, the results have limited
reliability. The difference in signiﬁcance of the concordance coefﬁcients between the complete version
and the short version of the game, observed in Tables9 and 10, may be due to the limited number of
ways that tokens can be allocated in the short version. For this reason, the discussion below is based
only on the more robust results obtained for the complete version.
Champ et al. (1997) and Champ and Bishop (2001) suggest that hypothetical bias is manifested by
an identiﬁable minority of subjects. Following upon this conjecture, we wanted to test whether complete
version players grouped by their risk perception towards Pocket/Pot would exhibit different behavior in
terms of the hypothetical bias presence within each group. Additionally, we conducted the same analysis
for the players grouped by the presence of social, moral, or ethical bias.
After grouping the complete version players by their risk perception with regard to Pot/Pocket
(riskPock), we checked to see if there was any difference in investment behavior between hypotheti-
cal and real rounds within each group. Speciﬁcally, the following null hypothesis is tested:
H0 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket)
k




H1 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket)
k
i 6= Real (Pot¡Pocket)
k
i ;
where k 2 [1;2] indicates two groups of players: the ﬁrst group consists of players who found the Pot
to be riskier than the Pocket, while players in the second group found the Pocket to be riskier than the
Pot; i 2 [1;3] denotes the round pairs’ number; and (Pot¡Pocket) is the difference in Pot contributions
relative to Pocket investments.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the (Pot¡Pocket) investments in hypotheti-
cal and real rounds within a group; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference (Friedman test).
Table11 contains Friedman’s test results for the difference in behavior across the three pairs of hypo-
thetical/real rounds for each group. Results indicate that those who found the Pot to be riskier than the
Pocket (eight players out of forty two), exhibit highly signiﬁcant negative relative hypothetical bias in the
ﬁrst hypothetical/real rounds and signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant positive relative hypothetical bias
in the second and third pairs of hypothetical/real rounds. Those who found the Pocket to be riskier than
33Table 9: Kendall’s Concordance Coefﬁcients Between Relative/Absolute Hypothetical Bias
and Respondent Characteristics Across Round Pairs, Complete Version
Factorsb RHBa AHB
1H/1R 2H/2R 3H/3R 1H/1R 2H/2R 3H/3R
Gender 0.1373 ¡0.0174 0.0342 0.1193 ¡0.0441 0.0417
(0.3141) (0.8978) (0.7992) (0.3923) (0.7475) (0.7594)
Student 0.1172 ¡0.0181 0.0711 0.0857 ¡0.0137 0.1036
(0.3592) (0.8870) (0.5732) (0.5120) (0.9148) (0.4166)
Expenditures 0.0000 ¡0.1450 0.0136 0.1090 ¡0.1471 0.0192
(1.0000) (0.2339) (0.9105) (0.3831) (0.2322) (0.8746)
Part-time job 0.0334 ¡0.1741 ¡0.2877** 0.0000 ¡0.1713 ¡0.2587*
(0.8063) (0.1989) (0.0326) (1.0000) (0.2116) (0.0573)
Volunteering ¡0.0636 ¡0.2049 ¡0.2858** ¡0.0102 ¡0.2357* ¡0.2849**
(0.6251) (0.1133) (0.0263) (0.9389) (0.0718) (0.0284)
Game Experience ¡0.0230 0.0768 ¡0.0699 0.0330 0.1096 ¡0.0581
(0.8525) (0.5322) (0.5668) (0.7942) (0.3780) (0.6375)
risk ¡0.0477 0.0590 0.0671 0.0028 0.0745 0.0445
(0.6858) (0.6148) (0.5647) (0.9817) (0.5299) (0.7056)
maxPock 0.0252 0.1444 0.1530 ¡0.0144 0.1855 0.1340
(0.8239) (0.1990) (0.1705) (0.9006) (0.1026) (0.2348)
maxPot ¡0.0164 ¡0.2553** ¡0.1225 0.0354 ¡0.2652** ¡0.0981
(0.8850) (0.0232) (0.2729) (0.7592) (0.0197) (0.3848)
safe ¡0.1598 ¡0.1121 ¡0.1556 ¡0.1496 ¡0.1048 ¡0.1391
(0.1576) (0.3189) (0.1638) (0.1955) (0.3566) (0.2179)
strMany ¡0.0126 0.1070 0.1090 ¡0.0171 0.1098 0.1489
(0.9114) (0.3409) (0.3292) (0.8827) (0.3339) (0.1868)
random ¡0.0214 0.2515** 0.1850* ¡0.0105 0.2640** 0.1689
(0.8500) (0.0253) (0.0978) (0.9276) (0.0203) (0.1346)
riskPock 0.3472*** ¡0.1867* ¡0.1163 0.3109*** ¡0.2007* ¡0.1539
(0.0021) (0.0967) (0.2976) (0.0071) (0.0774) (0.1725)
bias ¡0.2256* ¡0.1116 ¡0.0348 ¡0.2651* ¡0.0844 ¡0.0177
(0.0980) (0.4102) (0.7957) (0.0573) (0.5380) (0.8967)
a RHB and AHB are relative and absolute hypothetical bias, respectively. 1H/1R, 2H/2R, and 3H/3R denote ﬁrst, second, and third
pairs of (H)ypothetical/(R)eal rounds, respectively.
b Test p-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level,
respectively.
34Table 10: Kendall’s Concordance Coefﬁcients Between Relative/Absolute Hypothetical
Bias and Respondent Characteristics Across Round Pairs, Short Version
Factorsb RHBa AHB
1H/1R 2H/2R 3H/3R 1H/1R 2H/2R 3H/3R
Gender ¡0.1939 ¡0.1855 ¡0.1201 ¡0.1544 ¡0.1928 ¡0.1105
(0.2057) (0.2118) (0.4244) (0.3349) (0.2015) (0.4724)
Student ¡0.0022 0.1196 0.1490 0.0434 0.1144 0.1383
(0.9880) (0.3929) (0.2926) (0.7736) (0.4210) (0.3397)
Expenditures ¡0.2085 0.2185* 0.3414** ¡0.1453 0.1996 0.3933***
(0.1310) (0.1027) (0.0117) (0.3133) (0.1422) (0.0045)
Part-time job 0.0200 ¡0.1096 ¡0.1039 0.0305 ¡0.1221 ¡0.1087
(0.8961) (0.4605) (0.4895) (0.8489) (0.4185) (0.4799)
Volunteering ¡0.0444 0.3317** ¡0.0249 ¡0.0908 0.3427** ¡0.0473
(0.7635) (0.0206) (0.8638) (0.5564) (0.0186) (0.7499)
Game Experience ¡0.0290 0.0387 0.1984 ¡0.0207 0.0417 0.1929
(0.8365) (0.7767) (0.1507) (0.8880) (0.7635) (0.1721)
risk ¡0.1147 ¡0.0263 0.2326* ¡0.0855 ¡0.0216 0.2034
(0.3887) (0.8485) (0.0750) (0.5383) (0.8691) (0.1280)
maxPock 0.2273* 0.2800** 0.0721 0.1674 0.2806** 0.0682
(0.0736) (0.0232) (0.5635) (0.2068) (0.0251) (0.5929)
maxPot ¡0.2060* ¡0.2435** ¡0.1304 ¡0.1517 ¡0.2568** ¡0.1436
(0.1050) (0.0483) (0.2959) (0.2528) (0.0403) (0.2603)
safe ¡0.0924 0.0149 0.0172 ¡0.0256 0.0323 ¡0.0108
(0.4674) (0.9038) (0.8906) (0.8469) (0.7964) (0.9327)
strMany 0.0568 ¡0.0215 ¡0.0995 0.1477 ¡0.0017 ¡0.1221
(0.6547) (0.8614) (0.4250) (0.2653) (0.9892) (0.3387)
random 0.0391 0.0348 0.1510 ¡0.0650 0.0017 0.1759
(0.7585) (0.7779) (0.2261) (0.6240) (0.9892) (0.1679)
riskPock 0.0355 ¡0.1309 ¡0.0377 0.0098 ¡0.1276 ¡0.0323
(0.7798) (0.2886) (0.7622) (0.9408) (0.3085) (0.8000)
bias 0.1925 ¡0.1749 ¡0.1763 0.1747 ¡0.1700 ¡0.1643
(0.2089) (0.2390) (0.2407) (0.2751) (0.2600) (0.2856)
a RHB and AHB are relative and absolute hypothetical bias, respectively. 1H/1R, 2H/2R, and 3H/3R denote ﬁrst, second, and third
pairs of (H)ypothetical/(R)eal rounds, respectively.
b Test p-values are in parenthesis. ***, **, and * denote that estimates are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level,
respectively.
35the Pot did not demonstrate any statistically signiﬁcant hypothetical bias in any pair of hypothetical/real
rounds.
Note the peculiarities in behavior of those players who ﬁnd the Pot to be riskier than the Pocket.
Even though these players believe that the Pot is riskier, they put 1.25 more tokens in the Pot than in the
Pocket in the ﬁrst real round. In the ﬁrst hypothetical round, this group of players behaves in line with
their assessment of the Pot riskiness: they invest 4.625 more tokens in the Pocket than in the Pot. In
the second and third pairs of round, these players put more in the Pocket than in the Pot in real rounds
and more in the Pot than in the Pocket in hypothetical rounds. Those players who ﬁnd the Pocket to be
riskier than the Pot, on the other hand, behave consistently throughout the game by investing more in the
Pot than in the Pocket.
Table 11: Pocket/Pot Riskiness Grouping. Test for the Difference between Hypothetical and
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments, Complete Version
Rounds ‘Pot is Riskier’ ‘Pocket is Riskier’
Group Group
Number of players 8 34
First hypothetical and ﬁrst real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investmentsa ¡4.625 2.706
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investmentsb 1.250 3.588
Friedman Statisticc 5.0000 0.7273
(0.0254) (0.3938)
Second hypothetical and second real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 1.125 2.735
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments ¡4.625 3.559
Friedman Statistic 5.0000 0.0435
(0.0254) (0.8343)
Third hypothetical and third real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 0.125 1.000
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments ¡2.375 2.588
Friedman Statistic 2.6670 0.0000
(0.1025) (1.0000)
a Average hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) investments are computed across all players for the corresponding hypothet-
ical round.
b Average real (Pot¡Pocket) investments are computed across all players for the corresponding real round.
c The Friedman test p-values are in parentheses.
Instructions to the game were prepared with an intention that, while listening to the instructions, sub-
jects should not have gotten an impression that the Pot was being presented as an alternative preferable
to the Pocket on social, moral, or ethical grounds. Nonetheless, 40–43% of all respondents purported the
experimenter’s intention to promote the Pot; see Figure10. This suggests that some people perceived a
hidden message in the experiment concerning Pot contributions.
If one assumes that people exhibit hypothetical bias as a result of purchasing moral satisfaction
and/or of compliance bias, then, by eliminating warm glow and/or compliance bias, one can reduce the
hypothetical bias. If this conjecture is true, then the group of subjects that purported the experimenter’s
36Figure 10: Purported Bias Toward the Pot
































bias toward the Pot should exhibit hypothetical bias for all three pairs of hypothetical/real rounds, and
the other group that did not sense such an intention should not demonstrate the presence of hypothetical
bias. The following null hypothesis was formulated and tested to this end:
H0 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket)
k




H1 : Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket)
k
i 6= Real (Pot¡Pocket)
k
i ;
where k 2 [1;2] indicates the group of players: the ﬁrst group consists of players that purported the
experimenter’s bias toward the Pot, and players in the second group did not sense such an intention;
i 2 [1;3] denotes the round number; and (Pot¡Pocket) is the difference in Pot contributions relative to
Pocket investments.
The null hypothesis is that there is no difference between the (Pot¡Pocket) investments in hypothet-
ical and real rounds within a group; the alternative hypothesis is that there is a difference. Results of
Friedman’s test for the difference in behavior across the three pairs of hypothetical/real rounds due to
the bias towards the Pot are presented in Table12. Results indicate that those who found some social,
moral, or ethical bias in the game instructions, demonstrate a signiﬁcant negative hypothetical bias in the
ﬁrst pair of hypothetical/real rounds only. No bias is detected for the subsequent rounds. Those players
who did not ﬁnd any Pot promotion bias, do not demonstrate any signiﬁcant hypothetical bias. Thus, the
above conjecture that hypothetical bias is caused to some extent by the purchase of moral satisfaction is
not fully supported by the data.
One can also try and group players by both risk perception and social bias (to obtain four groups),
but having too many categories with the small sample size would result in a very few observations in a
category. Any statistical test done in a setting like that would have virtually no power.
To summarize, the validity of the short version conclusions regarding the factor analysis for hypo-
thetical bias may be questionable because of the limited investment options in the short version. Thus
exploratory factor analysis on hypothetical bias is based on the complete version of the game. It is re-
vealed that the small group of players who found the Pot to be riskier than the Pocket (the ‘Pot is riskier’
37Table 12: Sense of Pot Promotion Bias Grouping. Test for the Difference between
Hypothetical and Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments, Complete Version
Rounds ‘Bias’ Group ‘No Bias’ Group
Number of players 17 25
First hypothetical and ﬁrst real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investmentsa ¡0.412 2.480
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investmentsb 3.529 2.880
Friedman Statisticc 4.5714 0.0769
(0.0325) (0.7815)
Second hypothetical and second real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 0.882 3.480
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 1.529 2.320
Friedman Statistic 0.0909 1.4706
(0.7630) (0.2253)
Third hypothetical and third real:
Hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 0.059 1.360
Real (Pot¡Pocket) Investments 1.176 1.960
Friedman Statistic 0.2857 0.2222
(0.5930) (0.6374)
a Average hypothetical (Pot¡Pocket) investments are computed across all players for the corresponding hy-
pothetical round.
b Average real (Pot¡Pocket) investments are computed across all players for the corresponding real round.
c The Friedman test p-values are in parentheses.
38group), exhibit signiﬁcant or marginally signiﬁcant hypothetical bias in all round pairs. Those who found
the Pocket to be riskier than the Pot (the ‘Pocket is riskier’ group) did not demonstrate any statistically
signiﬁcant hypothetical bias in any pair of hypothetical/real rounds. In addition, the conjecture that hy-
pothetical bias is caused to some extent by the purchase of moral satisfaction is not fully supported by
the data.
6 Conclusions
The objective of the present study was to design an experiment, based on the public contribution game,
which would shed some light on the magnitude of the hypothetical bias and help to reveal factors re-
sponsible for it. The key novelty in our study was the inclusion of a free-riding barring mechanism in a
standard public goods game; also important were the steps we took to make the game have a look and
feel of a real-world tradeoff between private investment and public good provision.
As a result of the laboratory experiment on budget allocation/investment behavior in different en-
vironments, several results have emerged. First, a statistically signiﬁcant negative hypothetical bias is
found between the ﬁrst hypothetical and the ﬁrst real rounds of the game. The bias in the subsequent
second and third hypothetical/real pairs alternates in sign but is not statistically signiﬁcant, despite hav-
ing this peculiar oscillating pattern. The ﬁnding of a negative hypothetical bias is particularly intriguing
in light of several recent studies which took steps to mitigate it without ﬁrst establishing its existence.
For example, Bulte et al. (2005) and Aadland, Caplan, and Phillips (2007) assume that hypothetical
bias exists and is positive. Having based their results on this assumption, they conclude that a ‘cheap
talk’ script and a ‘consequential’ survey or experiment may have a mitigating effect. The experiment
presented in this study may provide a useful platform to investigate whether stated public good demand
would still be lower in the bias mitigating settings even if there is no hypothetical bias to begin with.
The reasons for the negative sign of hypothetical bias detected in the ﬁrst pair of hypothetical/real
rounds remain open to speculation. This non-conventional result requires further investigation. One
possible explanation is that what seems to be a negative hypothetical bias with respect to the Pot is in
fact more of a positive hypothetical bias from the Pocket perspective. That is, players put more tokens
to the Pocket when their choices were hypothetical—no consequences to risk—but their real Pocket
contributions were more moderate because the risk of losing tokens became real. This conjecture could
be examined by changing the odds of the Pocket lottery from 50/50 to 67/33, or even 75/25, where ﬁrst
number denotes the probability of success (tokens double) and the second one that of failure (tokens are
decimated by half).
Additionally, a source of negative hypothetical bias can lie in the modiﬁed public goods mechanism
itself. When players make their token allocations, they are seeking a return on their investments rather
than an increase in public well-being (when subjects purchase a public good in a valuation study). This
might explain in part why the difference in hypothetical versus real investments turns out to be negative
in the experiment. What follows is that the experiment presented in this study may provide a useful
platform to investigate how different experimental designs affect the presence and sign of hypothetical
bias.
The reasons why we detect hypothetical bias in the ﬁrst pair of hypothetical/real rounds and not in
consecutive rounds are not clear. This issue requires further investigation. A possible explanation based
on the fact that players might have gained some experience with the game (McClelland, Schulze, and
Coursey 1993) does not seem to be supported by the data. We checked the hypothesis that people exhibit
hypothetical bias as a result of purchasing moral satisfaction and/or of compliance bias. Data collected
during the experiment do not seem to fully support this hypothesis.
The grouping of players by their risk perception toward the private and public investment—the
Pocket and the Pot—reveals that those who found the Pot to be riskier than the Pocket, that is, those who
may consider the reliance on other peoples’ choices to be risky, demonstrate a signiﬁcant hypothetical
bias regardless of what round of the game being played. Those players who found the Pocket to be
riskier than the Pot did not demonstrate any hypothetical bias at all. We believe that risk associated
39with other players’ choices as a factor contributing to the existence of hypothetical bias requires further
investigation.
The experiment design of this study has its limitations. First, the absence of a practice round in the
experiment may have resulted in players being confused or unclear about the game environment. Second,
unrealistically low initial endowment in the amount of ten tokens does not necessarily motivate players
to reveal their ‘true’ preferences regarding the investment options offered in the game. Third, the random
dictatorship mechanism is intended to eliminate free-riding but if players are confused about the game
they may have still behaved strategically (at least in the ﬁrst rounds) and the ﬁnding of a statistically
signiﬁcant negative hypothetical bias in the ﬁrst pair of rounds is compromised. Fourth, the external
validity of a situation when the random-dictator overrules the individual decision about one’s private
investment (when a pledge drawn by the computer is more than one’s pot contribution and uninvested
tokens are not enough to cover the deﬁcit) is questionable. Finally, by the game construction, it is
impossible to distinguish between the complexity result and the status quo bias.
Perhaps the most important recommendation that can be made for stated choice/contingent valuation
studies is that one should be cautious in making a priori assumptions about the existence of hypothetical
bias and, especially, in using rules-of-thumb for calibration (like ‘divide by two’) as the magnitude of
hypothetical bias seems to be sensitive to the experiment design. Also, when respondents are queried on
their preferences through a sequence of choice situations, the researcher is advised to take into account
possible temporal changes. It may be wise to apply some sort of ‘burn-in’ approach to the series of
responses or to use a system of weights. Finally, no a priori assumptions should be made with respect to
choice complexity, since some respondents feel better with more varied/less restrictive choice sets while
others prefer simpler but more restrictive setups.
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